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Abstract 
Many states and countries have adopted or are in the process of crafting policies to enable geologic carbon sequestration projects. 
These efforts reflect the recognition that existing statutory and regulatory frameworks leave ambiguities or gaps that elevate 
project risk for private companies considering carbon sequestration projects, and/or are insufficient to address a government’s 
mandate to protect the public interest. We have compared the various approaches that United States’ state and federal 
governments have taken to provide regulatory frameworks to address carbon sequestration. A major purpose of our work is to 
inform the development of any future legislation in California, should it be deemed necessary to meet the goals of Assembly Bill 
1925 (2006) to accelerate the adoption of cost-effective geologic sequestration strategies for the long-term management of 
industrial carbon dioxide in the state.  
Our analysis shows that diverse issues are covered by adopted and proposed carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) legislation 
and that many of the new laws focus on defining regulatory frameworks for underground injection of CO2, ambiguities in 
property issues, or assigning legal liability. While these approaches may enable the progress of early projects, future legislation 
requires a longer term and broader view that includes a quantified integration of CCS into a government’s overall climate change 
mitigation strategy while considering potentially counterproductive impacts on CCS of other climate change mitigation 
strategies. Furthermore, legislation should be crafted in the context of a vision for CCS as an economically viable and widespread 
industry.  
In California, CCS is not included quantitatively as a strategy to reduce future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In part, this 
reflects the focus of most state agencies on short term goals, such as the AB 32 goal to return California emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2020. It also reflects the lack of data necessary to predict how rapidly and to what degree CCS could be deployed to meet 
short or long term goals. The lack of timely consideration of CCS as a mitigation alternative, however, has the potential to lead, 
albeit unintentionally, to policies which may make CCS adoption less likely and more expensive in the long run. For example, 
consideration of the economic and other risks associated with CCS is presently a disincentive to adopt CCS if other alternatives, 
such as fuel switching, can meet legislated requirements to reduce carbon emissions.  
While an important function of new CCS legislation is enabling early projects, it must be kept in mind that applying the same 
laws or protocols in the future to a widespread CCS industry may result in business disincentives and compromise of the public 
interest in mitigating GHG emissions, particularly in cases where different stakeholders are responsible for capture, transport, and 
sequestration elements of a project. Protection of the public interest requires that monitoring and verification track the long term 
fate of pipelined CO2 regardless of its end use in order to establish that climate change goals are being met. Legislative mandates 
that require CO2 producers to verify carbon reductions via sequestration, and which are crafted under the assumption that CO2 
capture, transport and storage is linear and maintained under a single stewardship, may result in reducing the incentive to 
participate in the efficiencies of a collective transport and sequestration system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2009 European Parliament Directive on geologic storage of CO2 is one example of an effort toward 
comprehensive CCS legislation aiming to provide uniform regulatory and statutory criteria throughout the European 
Union [1]. This directive addresses exploration and permitting for CO2 storage sites, regulation of storage site 
operations, monitoring and verification of containment, mitigation and remediation of damages associated with 
storage, closure of storage sites, and post-closure responsibilities. Long-term liability is addressed, but pore space 
ownership or unitization is not.  
In contrast, in the United States in recent years, a diversity of legislative actions have been taken or proposed at 
both the national and state levels. Understanding the differences among these policies and how they impact the 
adoption of CCS is important for guiding both future CCS policy decisions and efforts to facilitate CCS 
commercialization. Numerous resources and databases are available that track CCS-related legislation in various 
countries and within the United States (e.g., [2], [3]). We have used these resources to examine differences among 
state and national approaches with the objective of providing guidance for future policy in California.  
In California, consideration of CCS tends to lag behind other greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation approaches, such 
as renewables, performance standards, or efficiency, which policy makers recognize and facilitate as components of 
the state’s plan to meet climate change mitigation goals. To be adopted widely, not only does CCS have to be 
established within regulatory and legal frameworks, but it also has to be included as a viable and reliable technology 
in climate policy and GHG emissions mitigation roadmaps, plans, and other policy instruments. If there is ambiguity 
over CCS regulation and accounting, industry will turn to other approaches presenting less business risk.  
So long as the world economy relies so substantially on fossil fuels to meet its energy needs, delaying the 
implementation of CCS will likely result in a dangerous shortfall in the GHG reductions needed over the next 10 to 
50+ years. For this reason, it is essential for policy makers to recognize the urgency of facilitating CCS in all its 
potential forms.  
It is important to note that CCS is often presumed to be synonymous with capture from large point sources and 
geologic sequestration in saline formations or nonproducing oil or gas reservoirs. However, there is growing 
recognition that permanent sequestration can also be achieved via use of the captured CO2 for beneficial purposes, 
such as cement manufacturing, enhanced hydrocarbon recovery, or enhanced geothermal systems in which CO2 is 
used as a working fluid. While CO2 injection into the subsurface for permanent geologic sequestration has additional 
specific and unique regulatory and statutory needs, nearly all options for permanent sequestration require clear 
policies setting a predictable and sufficient value for carbon and establishing rules by which adopters of these 
technologies can obtain credit for sequestered carbon.  
 
2. Overview of issues addressed by state laws and regulations on CCS 
 
Based on the authors’ opinions and those expressed in other published literature, e.g. [4], the key issues that a 
state or nation must address, at a minimum, to facilitate commercial-scale CCS are: 
 Providing an economic driver or incentive for reducing CO2 emissions from power and industrial 
sources 
 Defining accounting methods which qualify or require CCS (including beneficial use) under GHG 
emission reduction programs 
 For geologic storage, defining a site permitting process or delegating authority to a state agency to 
regulate CCS projects 
 For geologic storage, assigning and aggregating pore-space ownership and related property rights 
 Defining requirements and funding mechanisms for long-term liability and stewardship 
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As described below, various state or national policies have attempted diverse solutions to some of these issues, 
leaving some gaps as well as areas of potential conflict. The first two of these issues are discussed individually, 
whereas the last three are combined because many state legislatures to date have dealt with them collectively in 
single pieces of legislation 
 
3. Economic Drivers for CCS 
 
In August 2010, the U.S. government issued the “Report of the Interagency Task Force on Carbon Capture and 
Storage”, which states that the key barrier to CCS deployment is the lack of comprehensive climate change 
legislation. It notes that Administration analyses suggest that CCS technologies will not be widely deployed in the 
next two decades absent financial incentives that supplement projected carbon prices. The driver for current CCS 
projects in the private sector is anticipation of requirements to reduce GHG emissions; but, with ongoing policy 
uncertainty regarding the value of GHG emissions reductions, it remains difficult to define the business case for 
pursuing these projects [5]. 
In general, two alternative approaches to providing a value for GHG emissions cuts are suggested: cap-and-trade 
or command-and-control. Worldwide, cap-and-trade seems to be the preferred approach. In the United States, GHG 
emissions are not currently regulated at the national level, although Congress may eventually pass legislation 
requiring “cap-and-trade.” Some states already have mandated caps, such as California’s AB 32 directive to reduce 
the state’s emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.  
In the absence of successful federal legislation for a cap-and-trade program, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) is proceeding with GHG regulation under its Clean Air Act (CAA) authority, issuing 
an “endangerment finding” on December 7, 2009, which concluded that six GHGs, including CO2, may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger the public health and welfare [6]. The endangerment finding by the USEPA obligates that 
agency to resort to command-and-control methods to regulate GHG emissions. 
From the standpoint of CCS, the endangerment finding sets the stage for regulation of GHG emissions from large 
stationary sources under the CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Operating Permit (Title V) 
Programs, and this should provide an impetus for adoption of CCS. However, PSD applies to pollutants from new 
major sources or major modifications at existing pollutant sources, where the source is located in attainment areas or 
is unclassifiable with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). In order to reduce the number of 
regulated facilities to a manageable number, USEPA has proposed to initially limit PSD and Title V review to 
sources with over 25,000 tons of CO2 equivalent emissions per year. PSD permits require the use of Best Available 
Control Technology (BACT), determined by an analysis of the maximum degree of control that is achievable for a 
facility through application of available technology, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic 
impacts and other costs. Currently, there is no consensus on what BACT means in the context of GHG emissions 
and whether or how any sequestration method would be included as BACT.  
For geologic sequestration, sources emitting at the low end of the CO2 emissions range proposed for regulation 
under the CAA would not be large enough to warrant development of a stand-alone project. Without a pipeline 
infrastructure to collect and transport such emissions and without a market for trading allowances or offsets, it is 
difficult to see how these sources will be able to comply with these regulations. In addition, these regulations would 
likely be applied to geologic sequestration as well as enhanced hydrocarbon recovery projects. A leakage or fugitive 
emissions rate of a few tenths of a percent per year for a large multi-million ton sequestration project would have 
emissions within the regulated range.  
It is not clear, if a state or region already has a cap-and-trade system in place, how these systems would interface 
with the federal command-and-control methods. For example, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a 
collaboration among ten northeastern and Mid-Atlantic States to create a cap-and-trade system with the goal of 
reducing CO2 emissions from the power sector by 10% by 2018. The Western Climate Initiative (WCI), a collective 
agreement by seven western states and four Canadian provinces to reduce GHG emissions, also plans to roll out a 
cap-and-trade system. The WCI partner jurisdictions aim to reduce regional GHG emissions to 15 percent below 
2005 levels by 2020, with a cap-and-trade program fully implemented across the partnership by 2015.  
According to the Environmental Defense Fund [7], only six states actually have established caps for CO2: 
California, Connecticut, New Jersey, Hawaii, Maryland and Massachusetts; of these, the CCSReg database lists only 
California and Massachusetts as having any legislation related to CCS. In Massachusetts, SB 2768 directs the 
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Department of Energy Resources to establish an alternate energy portfolio standard as long as the net emissions rate 
does not exceed the average emission of existing natural gas plants in the state, and allows CCS to meet this 
standard [8]. In California, SB 1368 sets a similar kind of standard and also allows CCS as a method to meet the 
standard [9]. However, in both states, no accounting protocols appear to be developed to establish how CCS would 
count toward reductions under a cap or as a method to generate offsets. Some states have limited CO2 emissions for 
certain generators of GHG emissions with implicit reference to CCS, but without explicit direction on accounting; 
for example, Montana HB 25 prohibits approval of applications for equity interest or lease in facilities used to 
generate electricity with coal constructed after January 1, 2007 that do not capture and sequester a minimum of 50 
percent of the CO2 produced [10]. 
 
4. GHG Accounting 
 
Because CCS can include diverse industry sectors, it is difficult to establish accounting systems for cap-and-
trade or control-and-command programs. The accounting system could provide direct GHG reductions for capped 
sources, or be used to generate offsets for non-capped sources. However, it can provide neither of these kinds of 
credits for reductions unless accounting protocols are developed for both sequestration site operators and CO2 
generators. 
The USEPA’s proposed Mandatory GHG Reporting Rule [11] sets requirements for reporting GHG emissions 
for facilities that inject CO2. For sequestration sites, Subpart RR of the rule explicitly includes reporting the amount 
of CO2 sequestered using a mass balance approach and developing and implementing a monitoring, verification and 
reporting (MVR) plan approved by the USEPA. Whether these reporting rules will satisfy state regulators charged 
with determining credits for sequestration remains in question. The California Air Resources Board has put in place 
its own Mandatory Reporting Regulation to support compliance with AB 32.  
For sequestration, accounting protocols involve more than reporting. They must consider issues such as the 
length of time defined as permanent sequestration, the allowable cumulative uncertainty in measurements, how 
much sequestration credit should be granted when CO2 is used beneficially for EOR or other applications, what 
types of measurements should be required, the spatial and temporal distribution of measurements, and what criteria 
determine the period of time for geologic sequestration sites to be monitored after closure. Among regulators and 
stakeholders, there appears to be no consensus. Most existing state legislation and regulations do not address 
accounting, nor do the draft USEPA Class VI rules for CO2 sequestration injection wells.  
 There are at least a few examples where the lack of accounting and economic drivers has resulted in delays or 
cancellation of CCS projects. A first-in-kind project in California, proposed by Hydrogen Energy California 
(HECA) and Occidental Petroleum, involves building a power plant to burn petcoke to produce hydrogen and 
electricity and to sequester CO2 in Occidental’s nearby Elk Hills oilfield. Permitting the plant under the California 
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and the SB 1368 cap requires documentation by the oil field operator that the 
CO2 from the plant will be permanently sequestered. The permitting of the project involves several state agencies; 
however none of these agencies has protocols in place for accounting for the CO2. EOR produces back some 
fraction of the injected CO2, such that a diminishing fraction is repeatedly cycled through the system before an 
injected volume approaches complete sequestration. This cycling, fugitive emissions, and losses to produced 
saleable fluids, make defining accounting protocols particularly challenging. However, until the agencies involved 
can agree on such protocols, the plant’s permit is unlikely to move forward. In another California example, even 
with anticipated AB 32-mandated caps on CO2 emissions, a project developer cited the uncertainty in accounting for 
geologically sequestered CO2 as a GHG reduction measure, coupled with the lack of a CO2 price incentive, as 
important factors leading to the cancellation of a proposed project to geologically sequester its refinery emissions.   
 
5. Geologic Site Permitting, Pore Space Ownership, Unitization, Liability and Long-term Stewardship 
 
One of the first efforts in the U.S. to assess issues surrounding geologic sequestration was undertaken by the 
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC). In 2002, it established a Geological CO2 Sequestration Task 
Force and, in 2008, issued a legal and regulatory guide [12]. 
The USEPA Class VI rules were proposed in 2008 as amendments to Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
(CFR), parts 144 and 146, which establish federal requirements for injecting CO2 for geologic sequestration under 
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the authority of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). Currently, there is inconsistency in the classification of CO2 
injection wells, which have been permitted in various states as Class I hazardous or non-hazardous, Class II, or 
Class V. The Class VI draft rules do not address long-term liability, pore space ownership, and unitization, and leave 
uncertainties in how other important issues would be addressed, for example, transitioning projects permitted as 
CO2-EOR Class II wells.  
According to the CCSReg database, ten states have passed legislation related to site permitting for geologic 
sequestration (Wyoming HB 90, Texas SB 1387, Washington ESSB 6001, North Dakota SB 2095, Oklahoma SB 
610, Montana SB 498, Utah SB 202, Kansas HB 2419, Louisiana HB 661, and West Virginia HB 2860). These bills 
grant the authority to regulate geologic sequestration to a state agency or commission and instruct that entity to write 
detailed rules or regulatory requirements. In some cases, these bills were adopted prior to the USEPA’s issuance of 
the draft rules for Class VI, or they anticipate that agencies within their states will be granted primacy for Class VI 
wells after the USEPA adopts the new rules later this year.  
In some states, legislators also have addressed the issues of pore-space ownership, unitization, liability and long-
term stewardship in these same bills or through separate legislation. For example, Louisiana HB 661 authorizes the 
state Department of Natural Resources to regulate the storage and transportation of CO2, grants the power of 
eminent domain for geologic sequestration projects, authorizes the state to assume ownership of closed geologic 
storage facilities and release operators from liability, and creates a fund to pay administrative and long-term 
stewardship expenses [13]. Montana SB 498 authorizes the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation to regulate 
CCS, declares pore space the property of the surface owner, authorizes the state to assume liability for closed 
geologic storage sites, creates a geologic storage reservoir program fund, and provides for unitization for geologic 
storage [14]. In Texas, SB 1387 instructs the Texas Railroad Commission to write rules for geologic storage of CO2, 
creates the anthropogenic carbon dioxide storage trust fund to cover long-term monitoring of geologic storage 
facilities, and orders a study on management of geologic storage on state-owned lands. The bill also directs the 
Railroad Commission to seek primary enforcement authority for geologic storage from the federal government and 
creates the anthropogenic carbon dioxide storage trust fund to cover administrative costs associated with permitting, 
oversight, and remedial action for geologic storage facilities [15]. In Wyoming, HB 90 instructs the Wyoming 
Department of Environmental Quality to write rules for geologic sequestration of CO2; HB 17 establishes a fund for 
long-term stewardship expenses [16, 17]. In North Dakota, SB 2095 instructs the Industrial Commission to write 
rules for geologic storage site permitting, provides for eminent domain and unitization, authorizes the state to 
assume liability for closed storage sites, and establishes funds for administration and long-term stewardship of 
geologic storage sites [18]. 
It is important to note that many of the states actively developing legal and regulatory frameworks for geologic 
sequestration are those with significant coal, or oil and gas resources. In most of these states, state agencies are 
already regulating CO2 injection for EOR.  
 
6. The California Case 
 
California has been a frontrunner with respect to proactive legislation to deal with GHG emissions mitigation, as 
is highlighted by the Governor’s Executive Order S-3-05 of 2005, which set goals of reducing emissions to: 2000 
levels by 2010, 1990 levels by 2020 (which was codified into law by AB 32), and 80 percent below 1990 levels by 
2050 [19]. However, with the exception of SB 1368 and AB 1925, which directed several state agencies to make 
recommendations on how to facilitate adoption of CCS to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions from industrial sources, 
CCS has been conspicuously absent from most GHG reductions policy and planning in the state.  
It is important to note that California has a rather unique energy footprint among the states. Over 50 percent of its 
GHG emissions from the power sector come from imports from neighboring states, where most of that power is 
generated from coal. Within the state, most all power plants are fired by natural gas. In addition to natural gas plants, 
cement plants and refineries are the state’s largest point sources of CO2 emissions.  
CCS is not included quantitatively as a strategy to reduce the state’s future GHG emissions for 2020 or 2050. In 
part, this reflects the focus of most state agencies on the AB 32 goal. It also reflects the lack of data necessary to 
predict how rapidly and to what degree CCS could be deployed to meet short or long term goals. Furthermore, 
among state agencies, there is often an attitude that CCS is a technology for coal, and, if it plays a role in 
California’s GHG mitigation strategy, it is through application to coal plants that export power into the state. 
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California counts the emissions associated with its imported electricity as part of its GHG emissions inventory. 
Emissions performance standards required by SB 1368 were set so that most natural gas plants within the state 
qualify under the cap of 1100 lbs CO2/MWh, but which will require out-of-state coal plants to add CCS or switch to 
natural gas. Given that the cost of electricity generation is higher for natural gas than for coal and the cost of 
implementing CCS is greater for natural gas plants than for coal plants, the end result will likely be CCS 
implemented in the power sector at a higher overall cost.   
Other initiatives, such as the low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) and the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) seem 
designed to keep high carbon fuels, to which CCS is most efficiently applied, out of the state’s energy portfolio. 
While such measures may be sufficiently effective to meet the state’s 2020 goals, it is unlikely that this approach 
will be sufficient to address the deep cuts necessary to meet 2050 goals. Consideration of the economic and other 
risks associated with CCS results in a disincentive to adopt CCS if other alternatives, such as fuel switching, can 
meet legislated requirements to reduce carbon emissions in the near term. The lack of timely consideration of CCS 
as a mitigation alternative has the potential to lead, albeit unintentionally, to policies which may make CCS adoption 
less likely and more expensive in the long run and to more costly energy.  
Commercialization of sequestration technology requires incentivising industry to invest in projects and giving 
regulators the assurance that they can protect the public interest. Nevertheless, in the short term, facilitating CCS 
adoption also depends on establishing the commercial viability of the technologies, and this may mean allowing 
some early projects to go forward with special considerations. Examples of special considerations by legislation to 
enable early projects are the bills passed in Illinois and Texas to address FutureGen [20, 21]. However, it must be 
kept in mind that applying the same laws or protocols in the future to a widespread CCS industry may result in 
business disincentives and compromise of the public interest in mitigating GHG emissions, particularly in cases 
where different stakeholders are responsible for capture, transport, and sequestration elements of a project. Because 
geologic sequestration, in particular, involves cross-cutting industry sectors and regulatory agencies, legislation 
must also accommodate the differences among these sectors.  
One example of potential conflict is enhancement of the business case for CCS by the option to sell captured 
CO2 for beneficial uses, such as EOR, ECBM, natural gas storage cushion gas, or industrial processes. In this 
situation, the generation of the CO2 is done by one stakeholder, the sequestration by another, and the goals of these 
stakeholders may be contradictory. For example, a California power company may need to verify a specific amount 
of sequestration in order to meet mandates such as the SB 1368 level, whereas an oilfield operator who purchases 
that CO2 for EOR has incentive to maximize the recycling rather than the sequestering of his purchased CO2. 
However, these beneficial uses also may significantly improve the economics of a CCS project. For example, 
California’s oil and gas fields are a ready market for significant quantities of captured CO2 provided an accounting 
structure could accommodate the needs of purchasers and providers of the CO2. Unlike oil-producing states further 
east, California does not have a readily available and inexpensive supply of CO2. Pipelining CO2 from out-of-state 
sources has been estimated as too costly in spite of the recent history of high oil prices [22]. However, pipelining 
CO2 from local industrial sources may provide economically viable opportunities to sequester CO2 in these fields 
while obtaining the added value of enhanced hydrocarbon recovery.  
Enabling the growth of a CO2-EOR/EGR industry in California would require construction of a CO2 pipeline 
network into which numerous CO2 producers could sell into a multi-user market for CO2. As noted above for the 
HECA plant and the oil refinery cases, the lack of accounting protocols even for a simple case of single source-
single sequestration site delays or derails projects. While legislative mandates should facilitate such early projects, 
they would be crafted for projects in which CO2 capture, transport and storage is linear and maintained under a 
single, or at most dual, stewardship. Unless such mandates also are crafted with a view to the long run, they could 
result in reducing the incentive for CCS project developers to participate in the efficiencies of a collective transport 
and sequestration system. There are differences, albeit manageable ones, in accounting protocols for CO2 
commingled from multiple sources and sent to various sequestration sites or types compared to those for single 
source and sequestration site operations.  
Finally, carbon sequestration options must be integrated into government energy policy and infrastructure 
planning. In California, widespread adoption of CCS, along with integration of 33 percent renewables, will require 
substantive changes in energy infrastructure and its operation. Studies which combine consideration of sequestration 
opportunities, renewable integration, and transmission infrastructure are more likely to result in achieving the state’s 
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GHG mitigation goals for the power sector at lower cost and with greater reliability than those which consider these 
independently. 
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